Annals of Emergency Medicine
Volume 49, Issue 2 , Pages 206-209 , February 2007

Replacing Hindsight With Insight: Toward Better Understanding of Diagnostic Failures

  • Robert L. Wears, MD, MS

      Affiliations

    • Department of Emergency Medicine, University of Florida, Jacksonville, FL, and Clinical Safety Research Unit, Imperial College, London, England
    • Corresponding Author InformationAddress for correspondence: Robert L. Wears, MD, MS, 655 West 8th Street, Jacksonville, FL 32209; 904-244-4124, fax 904-244-4508
  • ,
  • Christopher P. Nemeth, PhD

      Affiliations

    • Cognitive Technologies Laboratory, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL

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 Supervising editor: Michael L. Callaham, MDFunding and support: The authors report this study did not receive any outside funding or support.Reprints not available from the authors.

PII: S0196-0644(06)02147-0

doi: 10.1016/j.annemergmed.2006.08.027

Annals of Emergency Medicine
Volume 49, Issue 2 , Pages 206-209 , February 2007